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INTRODUCTION 
 
Platform regulation has become the cause celebre of technology 
regulation: a call to regulate the intermediaries who provide platforms for 
networked digital services.1 These include the GAFA giants: Google, 
Amazon, Facebook, and Apple. Many policy entrepreneurs are peddling 
solutions as the policy cycle turns, in a classic Kingdon case of “solutions 
chasing a problem.”2 Yet networks are not new, and their platforms have 
been regulated for hundreds of years, generally unsuccessfully. In this 
																																								 																				
* I wish to thank the contributors to this special issue of the journal and its editors, and 
participants at the Georgetown Technology Law Review symposium on 23 February 
2018 on ‘Platform Law,’ especially Julie Cohen, Mireille Hildebrandt, Paul Ohm, 
Danielle Citron, James Grimmelmann and Deidre Mulligan. I also wish to thank the 
panelists and participants at the Wharton Business School symposium on ‘Twenty Years 
after the Digital Tornado’ on 10 November 2017, the contributors and participants at the 
Munster Institute for Information and Telecommunications Law twentieth anniversary 
symposium in Berlin, Germany on 15 July 2017, and the contributors and participants at 
the eleventh annual Gikii symposium in Winchester, England on 15 September 2017. All 
errors and omissions remain my own. 
1 This was recognized early in the commercial rollout of the Internet and the growth of 
electronic commerce. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the 
Presence of Network Externalities 94 J. POL. ECON. 822 (1986); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL 
R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 
(1999); PHILIP EVANS & THOMAS WURSTER, BLOWN TO BITS: HOW THE NEW 
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TRANSFORMS STRATEGY (1999); Mark A. Lemley & 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eocnomic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 
(1998); Yochai Benkler, Communications Infrastructure Regulation and the Distribution 
of Control Over Content, 22 TELECOMM. POL’Y 183 (1998); David S. Evans, Some 
Empirical Aspects of Multi-Sided Platform Industries, 2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 191 
(2003); Tim Cowen & Annabelle Gawer, Competition in the Cloud: Unleashing 
Investment and Innovation Within and Across Platforms, 85 COMM. & STRATEGIES, 45 
(2012).  
2 See generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 
(1984). 
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article, I take the long view, focusing on the railways/telegraphy 
regulation of the 1840s in England and the ‘fake news’ problems of 2011 
to date.3 I offer some historical examples that may be highly relevant to 
‘prosumer’ digital capitalism 180 years later. 
Prosumers (a term coined by Toffler)4 are active users who are 
sharing and producing content, rather than passively consuming it, notably 
‘hacking’ content using techniques famously described as “rip, mix, 
burn.”5 Any Internet user who has posted content, from Facebook to 
Twitter to blog posts to podcasts, has become a prosumer—though there 
are very broad categories, ranging from the occasional tweeter to the fully 
developed hacker. Over two billion people now use Google to search for 
content; Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp to share news, gossip, and 
photos; YouTube to watch and upload videos; and Twitter, Snapchat, and 
other sites to say just about anything.  
We are all becoming ‘prosumers’ sharing intimate details of our 
personal lives.6 But this ‘prosumer environment’ is currently either grossly 
unregulated7—leaving users’ data and content at the mercy of the 
multinational companies who host it and sometimes claim to own it—or is 
subject to knee-jerk over-regulation, as with the current ‘fake news’ law 
(“Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz”) in Germany.8 The prosumer 
environment is a new regulatory policy cycle in network regulation.9 
																																								 																				
3 See generally CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, NETWORK NEUTRALITY: FROM POLICY TO 
LAW TO REGULATION (2017) (I refer in this article to a much more extensive study of 
network neutrality and common carriage).  
4 ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE 11 (1980). 
5 IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD GOVERNANCE 
AND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2013).  
6 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (The basic insight of nudging consumners towards 
‘free’ platforms and their biases builds on this study.). 
7 Recent UK investigations include those carried out by the Competition & Markets 
Authority (Competition & Markets Authority Cases, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/cma-
cases?page=1 [https://perma.cc/L6VU-RXFU]), specifically those carried out by the 
Online Reviews and Endorsements section of the Competition & Markets Authority 
(Online Endorsements, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/online-endorsements-
potential-non-disclosure [https://perma.cc/R5LW-A8Z9]). See COMPETITION & MKTS. 
AUTH., THE COMMERCIAL USE OF CONSUMER DATA (2015), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA66-
L6EF]; David Currie, Homo Economicus and Homo Sapients: The CMA Experience of 
Behavioural Economics, Speech at New Zealand Commerce Commission Public Lecture 
(Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-currie-speaks-about-
the-cma-experience-of-behavioural-economics [https://perma.cc/C9ZF-CKUF].  
8 See Kirsten Fiedler, Reckles Social Media Law Threatens Freedom of Expression in 
Germany, EDRI (Apr. 5, 2017), https://edri.org/reckless-social-media-law-threatens-
freedom-expression-germany/ [https://perma.cc/AQW2-5NMT]; Andreas Splittgerber & 
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Regulatory responses are finally emerging, driven by both data 
protection and competition concerns.10 Yet the overarching need to ensure 
greater neutrality of intermediaries has largely been limited to last mile 
monopolists and mobile oligopolists: the legacy telecommunications 
companies who provide Internet access. These solutions depend on 
regulatory alignment between national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in 
antitrust, data protection, consumer protection, communications 
regulation, and other fields.11 That is far from guaranteed in a fragmented, 
technologically challenged, and budget-constrained agency field. As I 
explain in the final substantive section of the article, European lawmakers 
often use weasel words to disguise their preferred form of ‘co-regulation’ 
as self-regulation: the legislature and executive forcing companies to 
engage in what is formally termed “action short of law.”12  
In conclusion, I argue that what is needed is OffData, a new 
regulatory agency that provides a comprehensive ‘Prosumer Law’ solution 
that draws on competition, technology regulation, fundamental human 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																														
Friederike Detmering, Germany’s New Hate Speech Act in Force: What Social Network 
Providers Need to Do Now, REEDSMITH (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2017/10/social-mobile-analytics-cloud-
smac/germanys-new-hate-speech-act-in-force-what-social-network-providers-need-to-
do-now/ [https://perma.cc/L4HA-9N84].  
9 See, e.g., Joe McNamee, ENDitorial: Fake News about Fake News Being Fake News, 
EDRI (Feb. 8, 2017), https://edri.org/enditorial-fake-news-about-fake-news-being-news/ 
[https://perma.cc/T6XH-SGJU]. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the 
Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149 (2018).  
10 Competition law has shown concern for Internet platform dominance for twenty years. 
See Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Self Regulation and Antitrust, 
Prepared Remarks at the D.C. Bar Association Symposium (Feb. 18, 1998), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1998/02/self-regulation-and-antitrust 
[https://perma.cc/2LEW-4XGQ]; Herbert Ungerer, Ensuring Efficient Access to 
Bottleneck Essential Facilities: The Case of Telecommunications in the European Union, 
Speech at the Competion Workshop, Florence (Nov. 13, 1999), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_056_en.html 
[https://perma.cc/2V6V-U4R8];  European Commission Press Release IP/98/639, 
Commission Clears WorldCom and MCI Merger Subject to Conditions (July 8, 1998), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-98-639_en.htm [https://perma.cc/H6S7-8J5T]; 
Margarethe Vestager, Algorithms and Competition, Speech at the Bundeskartellamt 18th 
Conference on Competition, Berlin (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/bundeskartellamt-18th-conference-competition-berlin-16-
march-2017_en [https://perma.cc/5A7Z-RPJW].  
11 Rónán Kennedy, Rethinking Reflexive Law for the Information Age: Hybrid and 
Flexible Regulation by Disclosure, 7 GEO. WASH. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 124 
(2016).  
12 See generally CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, INTERNET CO-REGULATION: EUROPEAN 
LAW, REGULATORY GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN CYBERSPACE (2011). 
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rights, privacy, and free expression to ensure a fair and neutral deal for 
digital prosumers and citizens. 
 
I. THE GROWTH OF PLATFORMS 
	
Platforms are vital to the exchange of goods, services, and 
information in the socioeconomic realm. Platforms connect two parties via 
an exchange—whether the parties know each other or are anonymous—
thus, serving a vital function. This does not mean their role is confined to 
economics. The Catholic confessional, for instance, connects the penitent 
to their alter ego via a priest, with indirect reward via exchange of alms for 
virtue; yet the primary purpose of organised religion is held to be spiritual, 
or at least socio-political despite their economic power (and economic 
predominance in Western society until the Reformation). It is noteworthy 
that there are more adherents to Facebook’s and Google’s platforms than 
to any organised religion in the history of the world.13 Both platforms, and 
notable rivals Apple and Amazon, have grown fastest in Latin speaking 
nations and those that were successfully colonised and where some of the 
population continues to use the language and religion of Catholicism or 
Western non-conformism. Their usage is restricted by consumer and/or 
government in Cyrillic language nations (the former Soviet bloc) and 
China.14 Catholicism’s Reformation and the emergence of platform 
regulation has more than just historical and geographical parallels.15 
Platform power in the modern world emerged with the 
extraordinary innovation of the railway running over common land 
purchased from the public, thus creating a common carriage system that 
																																								 																				
13 Measured as either Monthly Average Users or Daily Average Users, both companies 
have over two billion users. See Alphabet Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 31, 
2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1652044/000165204417000014/goog10-
qq12017.htm [https://perma.cc/Y8PQ-KGTE];  
Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2017 Results 
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-
details/2018/Facebook-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2017-Results/default.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/LD7G-VLMV].  
14 Maps of the world based on the dominant Internet platform have been produced by, 
amongst others, the Oxford Internet Institute. Information Geographies: Age of Internet 
Empires, OXFORD INTERNET INST., http://geography.oii.ox.ac.uk/age-of-internet-empires/ 
[https://perma.cc/8BLF-HERP]. 
15 John Naughton, Why We Need a 21st-Century Martin Luther to Challenge the Church 
of Tech, GUARDIAN (Oct. 29, 2017, 4:30 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/29/why-we-need-a-21st-century-
martin-luther-to-challenge-church-of-technology-95-theses [https://perma.cc/9TH9-
G55S] (explaining and summarizing John Naughton, 95 Theses about Technology, 95 
THESIS ABOUT TECHNOLOGY, http://95theses.co.uk/ [https://perma.cc/N78P-F46R]). 
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equally applied to the rapidly emerging electrical communications 
systems, telegraph and telephone, that ran alongside the railway. In the 
fifth Kondratieff wave in which we live (sometimes termed the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution),16 the microelectronic information technology 
revolution, data sharing platforms are of most concern. In this article, 
given my stated interest in the wider political economy and not simply 
economics, I focus on consumer platforms rather than business-to-
business transactions. The affordances of consumer information platforms 
connect consumers to businesses, notably via advertising, and are 
rewarded by the exchange of personal data on one side for targeted 
advertising revenue on the other. Note that the consumer is also a citizen 
and a producer of information, often in small doses such as individual 
social media status updates. The individual is thus in fact a micro-
prosumer. It is the rights of this prosumption culture that I have termed 
prosumer law and on which this article expands. As the prosumer is 
providing an inexhaustible, if not immortal stream of personal data, it is 
facile to compare that data to the oil in the information economy. The 
prosumer is actually more akin to a silkworm, producing a cocoon of silk 
that is harvested and recombinated by the social media platform owner to 
sell to advertisers as a multicolored marketing dreamcoat of networked 
information. Thus the law applies to the personal data trails of the worms 
in question: all Internet users.  
 
II. THE LONG VIEW: LEGAL HISTORY AND THE CREATION OF PLATFORM 
REGULATION 
 
Platform regulation using network effects to control downstream 
markets is nothing new.17 The history of the creation of antitrust in the 
United States is that of network regulation, to attack the railroad and 
Standard Oil trusts built in the corrupt politics of the Civil War and its 
aftermath (noting Abraham Lincoln was a railroad lobbyist from 1851 at 
																																								 																				
16 See Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Reovlution: What it Means, How to Respond, 
WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-
industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond [https://perma.cc/HS39-YXXJ].  
17 See MARSDEN, supra note 3, at 17–22 (This discussion forms part of a longer term 
international political economy project examining responses to previous monopolistic 
and oligopolistic communications industries in transition, building on my previous work 
examining the 1844 Railways Act.); id. at Chapter 2 (the ‘Edwardian Snowden’ critique 
of Victorian telegraph network surveillance); MARSDEN, supra note 12 (examining the 
concepts of regulation through technological means explored throughout the works from 
Christopher T. Marsden, Regulating the Global Information Society (2000)). See also 
Christopher T. Marsden, Law and Technology, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA of 
DIGITAL COMMUNICATION & SOCIETY (Robin Mansell et. al. eds., 2014).  
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least until his entry into politics).18 But competition policy in network 
industries has a longer history, notably in the first nation to create 
industrial private networked monopolies, the United Kingdom. The 
relationship of the United Kingdom as a superpower to the United States, 
China, and India was inverse to its current position. The United Kingdom 
was the high-technology global superpower, and the others were 
supplicants to British military-industrial19 and legal-managerial pre-
eminence.20   
In 1844, William E. Gladstone, then President of the Board of 
Trade, created the Railways Regulation Act (“1844 Act”),  passed into law 
on August 9 of that year, at the height of the “Railway Mania,” which 
peaked in the summer of 1845.21 This was the largest speculative boom to 
that point in human history—larger by far than the South Seas bubble of 
1720 or the Tulip Mania of 1637.22 Technology and financial deregulation 
worked hand-in-hand with the dramatic growth of the railways 
accompanied by the financial deregulations of 1825 and 1844.23 The 
railway bubble of the late 1830s was not halted by the 1844 Act, given 
																																								 																				
18 Sandra K. Lueckenhoff, A. Lincoln, a Corporate Attorney and the Illinois Central 
Railroad, 61 MO. L. REV. 393, 394 n.4 (1996). 
19 British mercenary armies raised by the private British East India Company defeated 
both the Chinese and Sikh Empire forces in a series of wars in 1838-49, taking full 
control of India, Pakistan and Hong Kong, after being comprehensively massacred in 
Afghanistan in 1838. See CRAIG MURRAY, SIKUNDER BURNES: MASTER OF THE GREAT 
GAME (Birlin Ltd. 2016). 
20 United States population trebled to 17 million by 1840 from only 5.3 million in 1800, 
but the British and Irish population was much larger until 1860 despite mass emigration: 
25.5 million in 1841 (15 million in 1801) and the entire British Empire over 259 million 
in 1861. See 1840 Census: Compendium of the Enumeration of the Inhabitants and 
Statistics of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (1841), 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1841/dec/1840c.html 
[https://perma.cc/V945-93VF]; CENSUS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1901: REPORT WITH 
SUMMARY AND DETAILED TABLES FOR THE SEVERAL COLONIES &C., AREA, HOUSES, 
AND POPULATION (1901), Table 4 at 12, 
https://archive.org/stream/cu31924030396067/cu31924030396067_djvu.txt 
[https://perma.cc/DD3N-MR7E].  
21 An Act to attach certain Conditions to the Construction of future Railways authorized 
or to be authorized by any Act of the present or succeeding Sessions of Parliament; and 
for other Purposes in relation to Railways. Railway Regulation Act 1844, 55 & 56 Vict. 
c. 10 (Eng.). See Andrew Odlyzko, The Collapse of the Railway Mania, the 
Development of Capital Markets, and Robert Lucas Noash, Forgotten Pioneer of 
Accounting and Financial Analysis (June 25, 2011) (unpublished paper), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1625738 [https://perma.cc/TAW7-
TB3Y]. 
22 See CHARLES MACKAY, MEMOIRS OF EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE 
MADNESS OF CROWDS (1841) (noting that this bubble was forewarned in this famous 
journalistic work on the previous bubbles). 
231825 6 Geo. 4 c. 91 (Gr. Brit). 
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that it only passed at the end of Parliamentary activity in the mania. The 
digital platform economy’s growth is by no means as large as the first 
“platform economy” boom—8% of UK gross domestic product (GDP) 
was privately invested in the railways in the mid-1840s, equivalent to $1.6 
trillion in capital investment in the United States in 2016.24 
Railway Mania was not just the result of technological progress, 
though railways created dramatically different economic conditions. For 
the first time in human history, national economies could survive a bad 
harvest, freeing the human condition from the basic need to avoid hunger 
or potential famine.25 It was also the result of speculative investment that 
had been barred from the South Sea bubble until the repeal of the Bubble 
Act in 1825 (the year of the first passenger railway, the Stockton and 
Darlington).26 This reform allowed for the formation of joint stock 
corporations with limited liablity, with further significant reforms in 1844 
and 1856.27 The latter came into effect after the Railway Mania’s collapse 
in 1847 and utilised for the manufacturing and trading corporations in the 
Second and Third Industrial Revolutions (from steam to steel to 
electrification and internal combustion).28 
The comparison with the modern period is striking. The waves of 
financial deregulation from 1970 were synergistic with the information 
technology revolution that enabled near-real-time global communication 
via satellite, telex, telephone, and latterly fibre-optic IP-based systems. 
That deregulation, including the repeal of Glass-Steagall via various 
																																								 																				
24 See United States GDP, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/united-
states/gdp [https://perma.cc/8GXX-FHNW]. 
25 Tragically, Ireland in 1844-1845 suffered a vast ‘Potato Blight’ induced famine, 
exacerbated by both the Corn Laws that protected English landlords and the entire 
absence of railways in Ireland outside Dublin and Belfast until that year. See Midland 
Great Western Railway of Ireland Act 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c.cxix (Eng.) (The 422 railway 
laws were removed from the United Kingdom statute book by the Statute Law (Repeals) 
Act 2013 c. 2.); Belfast and County Down Railway (B&CDR) incorporated in 1846; 
Cork, Bandon and South Coast Railway incorporated in 1845; Great Southern and 
Western Railway (GS&WR) incorporated 1844. The Bill of Repeal Importation Act 
1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 22 was passed 25 June 1846, with tariffs reduced by 1849.  
26 Bubble Act 1720 6 Geo 1, c. 18 (Gr. Brit.) (“An Act for better securing certain Powers 
and Privileges intended to be granted by His Majesty by Two Charters for Assurance of 
Ships and Merchandizes at Sea, and for lending Money on Bottomry; and for restraining 
several extravagant and unwarrantable Practices therein mentioned.”).  
27 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110 (Eng.); Joint Stock Companies 
Act 1856 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47 (Eng.). See Mark Freeman et al., Law, Politics and the 
Governance of English and Scottish Joint-Stock Companies, 1600-1850, 55 BUS. HIST. 
636 (2013). 
28 CARLOTTA PEREZ, TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL: THE 
DYNAMICS OF BUBBLES AND GOLDEN AGES (2002). 
2018 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 383 
reforms in the 1980s and 1990s,29  contributed to the extraordinary 
Internet (‘Dot-Com’) bubble of 1998 through 2001.30 Between March 
2000 and October 2002, the NASDAQ index of technology shares in 
public companies fell in value from $6.7 trillion to $1.6 trillion (a fall of 
76%).31 The failure to arrest the bubble’s causes can be partly laid as a 
cause of the much larger Great Recession of 2008. The failure to learn 
from an earlier bubble led to the latter: as with the railways in the 1830s 
and 1840s, so with the wider economy in 2001 and 2008. In 2008, the 
shocking claim repeated from the late 1990s was “this time is 
different”32—recalling Alan Greenspan’s claim that the stock market in 
1996 was “exhibiting irrational exuberance.”33  
 
III. FAKE NEWS: THE PROBLEM WITH NO SOLUTION 
 
If much of the growth of regulation in the nineteenth century 
concerns physical infrastructure on which the Internet was built in the late 
twentieth century, many of the twenty-first century problems in platform 
regulation concern content. The definition of ‘fake news’ as deliberate 
propaganda or ‘disinformation’ was made by the regional and global 
United Nations rapporteurs on freedom of information in March 2017.34 
This was reiterated in the European Commission High Level Expert Group 
report of March 12, 2018.35 The most recent iteration of the ‘fake news’  
																																								 																				
29 The Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2018) was partially repealed by 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338.  
30 See OM MALIK, BROADBANDITS: INSIDE THE $750 BILLION TELECOM HEIST (2002) 
(providing a near-contemporary account of the telecoms bubble). 
31 Chris Gaither & Dawn C. Chmielewski, Fears of Dot-Com Crash, Version 2.0: 
Venture Spending Soars, Especially for Web Video. Some Say It’s a Lot of Cash Chasing 
Too Few Ideas, L.A. TIMES (July 16, 2006), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/16/business/fi-overheat16 [https://perma.cc/GJS8-
APRT]. 
32 See generally CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS 
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009).  
33 Matthew J. Belvedere, Ex-Fed Chief Greenspan’s New Bond Bubble Warning Feels 
Like ‘Irrational Exuberance’ Déjà vu, CNBC (Aug. 4, 2017, 9:40 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/04/ex-fed-chief-greenspans-new-bond-bubble-warning-
feels-like-irrational-exuberance-deja-vu.html [https://perma.cc/99DA-DGYM].  
34 U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et. al., Joint 
Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News,” Disinformation and 
Propoganda, U.N. Doc. FOM.GAL/3/17 (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true [https://perma.cc/5TZC-TPM8].   
35 Euro. Comm’n, Directorate-Gen. for Comm. Networks, Content & Tech., A Multi-
Dimensional Approach to Disinformation (Mar. 12, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-
disinformation [https://perma.cc/VC93-ET7W]. 
384 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW Vol 2.2 
 
problem reached the West in the wake of claims of Russian interference in 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election and UK referendum on leaving the 
European Union.36 The problem of state-sponsored social media 
inaccuracy was first identified in the Ukraine in 2011, when Russia was 
accused of deliberately faking news of political corruption.37 The problem 
of fake news, however, is as old as the tablets of Hammurabi and almost 
as difficult to decipher.  
The issues implicated by fake news are very complex, and the 
solutions are drawn from two extremes, which can be represented on a 
non-intersecting Venn diagram. 
  
There is a vast gulf between commercial speech in newspapers and 
advertising self-regulation in printed and online publications on the one 
hand and broadcast content together with electoral spending by political 
parties on the other. Commercial speech is generally only subject to self-
regulation, while broadcast content is typically rigidly regulated by both a 
broadcast and an electoral regulator.38 In the UK, these regulators are 
Ofcom and the Electoral Commission, respectively. Generic regulation 
																																								 																				
36 See Robert Epstein & Ronald E. Robertson, The Search Engine Manipulation Effect 
(SEME) and its Possible Impact on the Outcomes of Elections’, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. 
SCI. E4512 (2015) (describing search engine manipulation for election interference).  
37 See Sergey Sanovich, Computational Propaganda in Russia: The Origins of Digital 
Misinformation (Oxford Computational Propaganda Research Project, Working Paper 
No. 2017.3, 2017), http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/89/2017/06/Comprop-Russia.pdf [https://perma.cc/2339-9EKH]. 
38 See, e.g., Jessica Elgot, Brexit: CPS Considers Complaint that Leave Campaigns 
Misled Voters: Case Argues Vote Leave and Leave. EU Made ‘Knowingly Misleading’ 
Assertions of Fact, Including Claim EU Cost UK £350m a Week, GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 
2016, 7:34 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/07/brexit-cps-
considers-complaint-that-leave-campaigns-misled-voters [https://perma.cc/K26D-
LYA4]. 
1.  Generic data protection (not U.S.)  
2.  Unfair consumer contract law 
3.  Fraud and (grossly) misleading advertising law  
4. Unsolicited commercial communication (‘spam’) law 
Election law 
(inc. 
broadcasting 
+ funding) 
Advertising 
self-
regulation 
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applies in varying degrees, especially in the EU context where consumer 
law is well-developed, especially for online transactions with the e-
Privacy39 and Distance Selling Directive.40 EU generic privacy law also 
applies, notably the General Data Protection Regulation.41  
Case studies can illustrate the problem. The first is egregious but 
obvious: the editor of the Daily Telegraph newspaper (which leans 
strongly towards the Conservative Party and is owned by non-domiciled 
billionaires) was fined £30,000 in 2017 by the privacy regulator, the 
Information Commissioner,42 for sending unsolicited electoral 
communications (specifically an email on General Election Day) to 
approximately 500,000 subscribers to the website. The email implored the 
recipients to vote for the Conservative Party.43 Readers may ponder 
whether a £30,000 fine fits the violation of user consent in providing their 
email to the Telegraph Group.   
The second case is that of Cambridge Analytica’s (CA) role in the 
Brexit referendum. CA is a company that develops psychological warfare 
(psy-ops) tools for use in election campaigns based on research conducted 
by British spy agencies in the Cold War.44 CA was used by the Steve 
																																								 																				
39 Council Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal Data and the 
Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 45. 
40 Council Directive 97/7/EC on the Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance 
Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 40 (no longer in force, date of end of validity: 06/13/2014, 
repealed by Council Directive 2011/83/EU amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and 
Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing 
Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, 2011 O.J. (L 304) 54). 
41 Council Regulation 2016/679 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016 O.J. (L 119) 59; See 
Nadezhda Purtova, The Law of Everything. Broad Concept of Personal Data and 
Overstretched Scope of EU Data Protection Law, 10 L. INN. & TECH. (forthcoming 
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3036355 [https://perma.cc/9QYR-B8W3]. 
42 Empowered under The Freedom of Information Act 2000 c. 36 § 18 (Eng.) and 
associated legislation. 
43 ICO Fines Telegraph Media Group for Election Day Email Campaign, ICO (Dec. 21, 
2015), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2015/12/ico-
fines-telegraph-media-group-for-election-day-email-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/N7LY-
FAZV]. 
44 CA’s founder Nigel Oakes founded the Behavioural Dynamics Working Group in 
1988, the Behavioural Dynamics Institute (BDi) in 1990, and the Strategic 
Communication Laboratories in 1993. See History of Behavioural Dynamics Institute, 
BEHAVIOURAL DYNAMICS INST. (Oct. 31, 2016), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171230210521/http://www.bdinstitute.org/about-
us/history/index.html [https://perma.cc/Q5WP-AL8U]; Sharon Weinberger, You Can’t 
Handle the Truth: Psy-ops Propaganda Goes Mainstream, SLATE (Sept. 19, 2005, 6:31 
AM), 
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Bannon and Mercer alt-right groups to help Nigel Farage’s unofficial Vote 
Leave group, which was also funded by Russian interests via near-
bankrupt insurance shill Aaron Banks, whose wife is a Russian national. 
Investment in social-media targeting was directly funnelled, via CA, to a 
Canadian web metrics company Aggregate IQ,45 Vote Leave. There were 
also two extremely unusual investments by a 23-year-old Brighton 
University student, Darren Grimes, who gave £625,000 and the Northern 
Ireland Democratic Unionist Party, which donated £400,000.4647 This 
amount—over £1,000,000—was spent in the last week before the 
referendum with the Canadian company. Some studies suggest a million 
potential swing voters were impacted by the Facebook misinformation 
campaign in which the Canadian company targeted potentially gullible 
undecided voters with known falsehoods about UK membership of the 
European Union.48 CA’s actions are being slowly investigated by the 
Electoral Commission.49  
In the latter case, the Electoral Commission requires the 
cooperation of companies that are non-domestic; all of whom are except 
Cambridge Analytica. It is also dealing with targeted social media 
profiling rather than standard electoral expenditure in qualifying media, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																														
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/dispatches/2005/09/you_cant_handle_t
he_truth.html [https://perma.cc/35D8-A7NU] (explaining the pioneering analysis of their 
role in psyops).  
45 Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Committee, Evidence from Christopher Wylie, 
Cambridge Analytica Whistle-Blower (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/digital-
culture-media-and-sport-committee/news/fake-news-evidence-wylie-correspondence-17-
19/ [https://perma.cc/E3TY-2UZW]. 
46 Carole Cadwalladr, Electoral Body Rejcts Claim by Vote Leave that it Allowed 
Donations: Electoral Commission Denies Assertion by Group’s Former Chief that it Sent 
Letter Permitting Payments to Other Anti-EU Campaigns, GUARDIAN (Nov. 25, 2017, 
4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/nov/25/electoral-body-rejects-
claim-by-vote-leave-that-it-allowed-donations [https://perma.cc/CQ5V-FCBM] 
(providing this election analysis). 
47 Northern Ireland electoral donations can be made anonymously as a result of past 
terrorist financing of political parties and the 1998 peace agreement that essentially 
adopted a “don’t ask don’t tell” attitude to political funding. See, e.g., 638 Parl Deb HC 
(2018) col. 259-260 (UK), https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2018-03-
21/debates/3D25C28E-9619-4E3C-99E3-
1AD565870B54/PoliticalPartiesLoansAndDonations [https://perma.cc/D86D-4WX5]. 
48 Id. 
49 Press Release, Electoral Comm’n, Electoral Commission Statement Regarding Vote 
Leave Limited, Mr. Darren Grimes and Veterans for Britain Limited (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/i-am-a/journalist/electoral-commission-media-
centre/news-releases-donations/electoral-commission-statement-regarding-vote-leave-
limited,-mr-darren-grimes-and-veterans-for-britain-limited [https://perma.cc/44R6-
AUE2]. 
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such as outdoor posters or newspaper adverts. UK electoral law does not 
permit any type of television or radio advertising by political parties.50 
Separately, the Information Commissioner (ICO) is examining whether 
CA abused the consent of Facebook and other identities which it targeted 
in its search for gullible undecided voters.51 
Electoral laws are national by nature (even for the European 
Parliament with some reservations), but the European Union recognized 
the trans-national character of the law in a 2017 communication and the 
establishment of a High Level Expert Group on fake news in 2018.52 
However, the latter was given approximately five weeks from its first 
meeting on January 15 to an internal drafting deadline of February 23 to 
arrive at its conclusions. Stunningly, the thirty-eight experts hit their 
deadline and published on March 12.53 Their recommendations were 
claimed as self-regulation using Codes of Practice, to which Google, 
Facebook, and Twitter signed up:  
 
[A] self-regulatory approach based on a clearly defined 
multi-stakeholder engagement process, framed within a 
binding roadmap for implementation, and focused on a set 
																																								 																				
50 Communications Act 2003 §§ 319(2)(c), 320, 333, sch. 12, ¶ 18 (Eng.); ROYAL 
CHARTER FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THE BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 2016, 
Cm 9365; Representation of the People Act 1983 §§ 66A, 92–93 (amended by Political 
Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 § 144). See Rules on Party Political and 
Referendum Broadcast, OFCOM (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-
on-demand/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code/section-six-elections-referendums for details 
[https://perma.cc/MR2G-DUKU]. 
51 363 Parl Deb HC (2018) Q.895, 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/digi
tal-culture-media-and-sport-committee/fake-news/oral/79824.html 
[https://perma.cc/5MR9-KU5R] (“Our investigation is comprehensive. It is a high 
priority for my office. I have about 10 people working on the investigation full time. It 
involves more than 30 organisations—social media platforms, as well as data analytics 
companies like Cambridge Analytica—and political campaigns and parties.”); see also 
Elizabeth Denham, Information Commissioner (ICO), ICO Opening Remarks - The 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) of the European 
Parliament - Hearing on the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica Case (June 4, 2018), 
https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/documents/2259093/ico-opening-remarks-ep-libe-
facebook-cambridge-analytica-20180604.pdf [https://perma.cc/26CD-6AA2]. 
52 Experts Appointed to the High-Level Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation, 
EUROPA (Jan. 12, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/experts-
appointed-high-level-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation 
[https://perma.cc/33TF-EZQ9].  
53 Euro. Comm’n, Directorate-Gen. for Comm. Networks, Content & Tech., A Multi-
Dimensional Approach to Disinformation (Mar. 12, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/news/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-
disinformation [https://perma.cc/5NWN-6EJR]. 
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of specific actions. All relevant stakeholders . . . are called 
upon to commit to a Code of Practices. This Code should 
reflect stakeholders’ respective roles and responsibilities.54  
 
The European Commission then asked for multi-stakeholder 
monitoring of whether the Codes are sufficient and “recommend[ed] 
establishing a Coalition representing the relevant stakeholders for the 
purpose of elaborating such a Code of Practices and ensuring its 
implementation and continuous monitoring and review.”55 The 
government role is restricted to monitoring self-regulation: “by March 
2019, consider options that may include additional fact-finding and/or 
additional policy initiatives, using any relevant instrument, such as 
competition instruments or mechanisms to ensure a continuous monitoring 
and evaluation of self regulatory measures.”56 
Note also that leading research from the London School of 
Economics and Oxford Internet Institute in the UK57 and Harvard 
University Berkman Center in the United States,58 produced no workable 
comprehensive definition of fake news (thus proving it to be a contextual 
term or political slogan), though many interesting insights into its 
propagation were observed. 
The relatively trivial reform that can be made to combat 
disinformation is to make it illegal to knowingly distort information and 
broadcast it to the public during electoral campaigns; and it is this law 
which was reformed in Germany and France in 2017.59 However, simply 
banning misinformation does not address non-affiliated campaigns by 
non-traditional political parties, nor does it deal with periods other than 
official elections. Russian propaganda, for instance, aims to construct a 
false narrative; create chaos and confusion in the perceptions of the broad, 
lesser-educated populace; and ensure truth and deception are equal in the 
worldviews of the non-politically engaged populace. This strategy does 
																																								 																				
54 Id. at 7. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 36. 
57 See DAMIAN TAMBINI, FAKE NEWS: PUBLIC POLICY RESPONSES, LSE MEDIA POL’Y 
PROJECT (Mar. 2017), 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/73015/1/LSE%20MPP%20Policy%20Brief%2020%20-
%20Fake%20news_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WWW-LRCL]; Philip N. Howard et al., 
Creativity and Critique: Gap Analysis of Support for Critical Research on Big Data (July 
15, 2016) (unpublished research note), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2822389 
[https://perma.cc/ER53-YC53].  
58 ROBERT FARIS ET AL., PARTISANSHIP, PROPAGANDA, AND DISINFORMATION: ONLINE 
MEDIA AND THE 2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. (Aug. 21, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3019414 [https://perma.cc/K45Y-SLXW]. 
59 Fiedler, supra note 8. 
2018 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 389 
not require electoral periods or political parties to manifest on social 
media. With this mindset, the bad actor simply requires some ‘alt-right’ 
subversion and an audience prone to conspiracy theories. It is therefore not 
just social media and far-right broadcasting but also charities and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) which can be the cause of intentional 
‘fake news’.  
Preventing public debate by NGOs is a tactic deployed by Putin’s 
Russia and many other less democratic states to prevent foreign, notably 
U.S.-financed, NGOs from arguing for anti-corruption campaigns, as they 
did in the Ukraine. The ‘colours revolutions’—fostered and partially 
financed by the Central Intelligence Agency in the late 2000s (orange in 
Ukraine, yellow or red in Georgia)—led governments to pass legislation 
that prevents such movements from being financed.60 To adopt similar 
legislation in democratic Western nations in order to combat Russian 
state-inspired revenge propaganda is a similarly unattractive speech-
limiting tactic. Moreover, withdrawing tax-exempt status from NGOs and 
charities which engage in political lobbying would place the regulator in 
the position of regulating speech. This has been an issue in the UK since 
the Lobbying Act 2014 put the Charities Commission in exactly the 
unenviable position of banning charities from lobbying for environmental, 
social, and peace objectives.61 
Disinformation, thus, exposes an interesting and challenging 
divergence of regulations imposing fairness requirements.62 These 
divergences limit states to strengthening electoral law and to 
reinvigorating often moribund electoral regulators. The alternatives are to 
make all commercial and NGO advertising subject to general rules, thus 
wildly expanding electoral law, or to extend broadcasting law. Broadcast 
advertising is either state regulated or, as in the UK, co-regulated under 
strict regulatory supervision.63 To extend such advertising limits to the 
Internet—even if only to major Internet platforms and newspaper 
websites—would be a political impossibility given the lobbying strength 
of the traditional media over traditional politicians. As Vint Cerf puts it:  
																																								 																				
60 See EVGENY FINKEL & YITZHAK M. BRUNDY, COLOURED REVOLUTIONS AND 
AUTHORITARIAN REACTIONS (2013).  
61 See HOUSE OF LORDS, LIBRARY NOTE, LOBBYING AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING: 
CHARITIES AND TRADE UNIONS, Aug. 2, 2016, LLN 16/041, at 2, 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/LLN-2016-0041/LLN-2016-
0041.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RCR-EJA7]; Kirsty Weakley, Charities ‘Outraged’ After 
Government Rejects Calls to Amend Lobbying Act, CIVILSOCIETY (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.civilsociety.co.uk/news/charities-outraged-after-government-rejects-calls-
to-amend-lobbying-act.html [https://perma.cc/FDD6-7RBU]. 
62 Christopher Marsden, Looming Battles in Britain: Fairness Regulations Meet the 
Marketplace 12 MEDIA STUD. J. 80 (1998). 
63 MARSDEN, supra note 12, at 151–52. 
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The technical community has the opportunity to produce 
tools that can be used by Internauts everywhere to separate 
quality information from dross, but the application of those 
tools falls to individual users willing to exercise critical 
thinking to get at the facts.64 
 
There is no comprehensive solution to the disinformation problem. 
In the UK, whose print media is notoriously right-wing, this is hardly a 
novelty. In 1922, The Daily Mail published a forged letter, ostensibly from 
the Soviet government to the UK Labour Party, in order to destroy 
Labour’s electoral ambitions. This politically explosive episode became 
known as the “Zinoviev affair” and continues to resound in British politics 
today.65 Ninety years later, the Parliament-appointed Leveson Inquiry 
concluded the first part of its “Inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics 
of the press” by recommending comprehensive co-regulatory press 
regulation reform.66 This has not been carried out despite a legislative 
provision in 2013. The newspaper press’ outrageous partisanship 
continued in the 2015 and 2017 elections, as well as the 2016 
referendum.67 In March 2018, the British government cancelled Part 2 of 
the Leveson Inquiry into police collusion with the national newspaper 
industry despite widespread evidence of continued criminality and 
corruption in public office for over two decades.68 Disinformation by the 
existing print press is tolerated and encouraged by lack of regulation, 
alongside claimed interest in the effects of social media falsity. Prospects 
for reform are vanishingly weak. 
 
 
																																								 																				
64 Vinton G. Cerf, Can Liberty Survive the Digital Age?, 60 COMM. ACM 7 (2017). 
65 See John Ferris & Uri Bar-Joseph, Getting Marlow to Hold His Tongue: The 
Conservative Party, the Intelligence Services and the Zinoviev Letter, 8 INTELL. & NAT’L 
SEC. 100 (1993). 
66 LORD JUSTICE LEVESON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURE, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OF 
THE PRESS (Nov. 29, 2012) (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/leveson-
inquiry-report-into-the-culture-practices-and-ethics-of-the-press [https://perma.cc/9JTP-
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67 See J. Green, British Election Study: The Politics of Competence-Paries, Public 
Opinion and Voters, ECON. & SOC. RES. COUN’L. (Sept. 2017), 
http://gtr.ukri.org/publication/overview?outcomeid=5aa9110a25f396.35296039&projectr
ef=ES/K005294/1 [https://perma.cc/CNJ3-RC4A].  
68 Graham Johnson, Hack Attack and Kompromat: Tony Blair’s Government Under 
Sunday Times Surveillance, BYLINE (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.byline.com/project/90/article/2080 [https://perma.cc/GZJ8-SMKU]. 
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IV. PROSUMERISM AND PRIVACY: THE PORTARLINGTON EFFECT 
 
U.S. platforms operate in the European Union under regulation 
imposed by European law. This is known in U.S. legal scholarship as the 
“Brussels effect,” whereby consumer data protection, and even 
competition law, is aligning globally to a de facto European standard that 
neglects the regulatory fragmentation of the European Union.69 Observers 
are aware that one of the twenty-eight Member States is about to “Brexit,” 
subject to successful negotiation of its retreat from European law’s “acquis 
communitaire.” However, there is a major regulatory alignment problem 
that is not cited in either Brussels or London.70 That is what I term the 
“Portarlington effect.” 
Separate the rhetoric from reality: it is the U.S. federal and state 
authorities and litigants in court which have far more vigorously pursued 
Facebook, Google, and others for their failures to guarantee users’ 
privacy. In 2012, Google settled a $22.5 million case brought by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) involving the tracking of cookies of 
Safari browser users.71 Before that, in 2011, Google reached an $8.5 
million settlement with the FTC for privacy breaches involving Google 
Buzz. Two months after the Google Buzz settlement, Facebook settled a 
class action with a $20 million payment into a compensation fund that—as 
with the Google Buzz settlement—largely funded privacy advocacy and 
education groups.72 In 2012, both companies agreed to settle privacy 
complaints and allow FTC privacy audits of their products for a twenty-
year period.73 It is noteworthy that the Irish Data Protection Commissioner 
did not fine either company a single Euro in either of the cases highlighted 
above, both of which were examined at length in the famous Schrems 
																																								 																				
69 Bert-Jaap Koops, The Trouble with European Data Protection Law, 4 INT’L PRIVACY 
& DATA L. 250 (2014) (“The trouble with European data protection law, as with Alfred 
Hitchcock’s Harry, is that it is dead.”). 
70 See David Erdos, European Data Protection Regulation and Online New Media: Mind 
the Enforcement Gap, 43 J.L. & SOC’Y 534 (2016). 
71 United States v. Google Inc., No. CV 12-04177 SI, 2012 WL 5833994 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
16, 2012). See Lauren-Kelly Devine, Court Approves Google's Privacy Settlement, REG. 
REV. (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2012/11/27-devine-ftc-
google.html [https://perma.cc/WJT3-NXRN].  
72 Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). See Christopher T. 
Marsden, Fraley v. Facebook, Inc. - $20m Settlement for Private Education/Research of 
Social Media Users, REGULATING CODE (Jan. 26, 2013), 
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[https://perma.cc/5ALM-CQFJ].  
73 See BROWN & MARSDEN, supra note 5, at 134, 188 (providing analysis of the FTC 
privacy cases). 
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European Court of Justice cases of 2015 and 2017.74 Sector-specific 
regulation of social networking already exists de facto in the United 
States, while European member states wring their hands on the sidelines as 
‘flag of convenience’ national regulators in Luxembourg and Ireland 
provide inadequate oversight.75 
For European data protection law purposes, U.S. multinationals are 
required to establish a legal presence in the European Union if they choose 
to process European citizens’ data (which, in practice, affects any Internet 
company of significant size).76 Many establish themselves in the Republic 
of Ireland, a small economy with strong socioeconomic and cultural links 
to the United States. The Republic achieved fast economic growth based 
on minimal regulations; so much so it was nicknamed the “Celtic Tiger.”77 
It became the European base, for data protection purposes, of Google, 
Apple, Facebook, and many other U.S. multinationals.78 
Portarlington is a small town built on a railway and canal junction 
in the middle of the Republic of Ireland. It is an inconsequential place of 
pebble-dashed houses, with twenty-eight public houses and not a single 
cinema or cultural space.79 As this poll took place, the entire Irish Data 
Protection Commissioner (IDPC) office was uprooted from Dublin to the 
Portarlington.80 The thirty or so staff were to move as one, but 
																																								 																				
74 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, 2015 E.C.L.I. 650 (Grand 
Chamber); see also Case C-498/16, Schrems v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 2018 E.C.L.I. 863 
(3d Chamber).  
75 Erdos, supra note 70. 
76 Cedric Ryngaert, Symposium Issue on Extraterritoriality and EU Data Protection, 5 
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 221 (2015).  
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cost manufacturing based around Knock Airport tax/duty free zone. See MERVYN 
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78 BROWN & MARSDEN, supra note 5, at 134–35. 
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(“[A] Centra minimart in the Irish countryside. ‘This is the Irish Data Protection 
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80 Angelique Carson, Billy Hawkes: Blue Eyes and a Global Sway, IAPP (Sept. 10, 
2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/billy-hawkes-blue-eyes-and-a-global-sway/ 
[https://perma.cc/UF9S-ME92]. 
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unfortunately, the desirability difference between their established Dublin 
location and Portarlington’s pebbledash meant many senior employees 
chose not to move, instead taking jobs with U.S. banks and tech 
companies arriving in large number in Dublin’s harbor zone.81 As a result, 
the IDPC staff of thirty was made up largely of trainees and new 
employees in the period up to 2014—a critical period for those 
companies’ data policies. The Commissioner, Billy Hawkes, was 
perceived to be ‘asleep on the job’ from 2005 to 2014, when many data 
breaches took place,82 culminating in the Edward Snowden revelations 
that U.S. multinational firms had been engaged in widespread illegal 
activity in passing European citizens’ personal data to the U.S. National 
Security Agency and its close British ally GCHQ. The IDPC had two 
devastating European Court of Justice defeats in 2014-15.83 
The perception of the ‘Portarlington Effect’ was so great by 2014 
that the major technology companies requested the Irish Government to 
reopen a satellite office in Dublin for their convenience84 and to make 
some effort to apply the relevant European laws, notably the ePrivacy 
(2009), Data Retention (2006), and Data Protection (1995) Directives.85 
The new IDPC since September 2014, Helen Dixon, may prove a more 
effective regulator. The regulatory culture in Europe remains deeply 
divided between those ‘Club Med’ less regulatory cultures and ‘Club 
Nord’ of established liberal democracies (roughly speaking those many 
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NRAs on the fringes of Europe versus Nordic nations, UK, Netherlands, 
France, Austria, and Germany). It is this ‘Portarlington effect’ which is the 
greater influence on European regulation generally and the data protection 
regime in particular. The claims that Europe has a generally more privacy 
protective culture would be greeted with gales of laughter in Portarlington 
or Limassol, Cyprus, whatever the opinion in Hamburg or Berlin. 
 
V. CO-REGULATION: A EUROPEAN APPROACH TO PLATFORM REGULATION 
 
Co-regulation may be the answer adopted in Europe.86 Co-
regulation encompasses a range of different regulatory phenomena, which 
have in common that the regulatory regime is made up of a complex 
interaction of general legislation and self-regulatory bodies.87 Varying 
interests of actors result in different incentives to either cooperate or 
attempt unilateral actions. Without regulation responsive to both market 
and constitutional protection of fundamental human rights, such as privacy 
and free speech, Internet co-regulatory measures cannot be responsive to 
information ecologies and, thus, cannot be self-sustaining.88 Co-regulation 
has enriched conceptions of “soft law” or “governance” in the literature. 
Like those umbrella terms, co-regulation refers to forms of hybrid 
regulation that do not meet the administrative and statute-based legitimacy 
of regulation, yet they perform some elements of public policy that cannot 
be justified as self-regulation in the absence of law.89 These forms of 
hybrid regulation establish public policies that do not emerge from self-
regulation alone.90 Co-regulation constitutes multiple stakeholders where 
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the state and stakeholder groups, including prosumers, explicitly form part 
of the institutional setting for regulation.91 
Prosumerism should be a declared policy of the European 
Commission alongside the European interoperability framework (EIF). 
The European Commission in 2012 launched its Code of European Union 
Online Rights for European citizens using the Internet.92 European e-
commerce and audiovisual law is a marked departure from freedom of 
contract in European law. Implementation requires all member states to 
commit to such a step in practice, as well as theory.93 This concern with 
prosumers was raised in European legislative priorities on March 6, 2018, 
with Vice President Ansip tweeting,  "Pleased to see full house of 
colleagues commissioners discussing upcoming proposals on #data, 
#platforms, #AI, #disinformation and #eHealth. We plan a smart & 
comprehensive #DigitalSingleMarket package for end April. Stay 
tuned.”94 
The Commission enforced new Terms of Service on social media 
companies on February 15, 2018, announcing via Twitter 
“#EU4Consumers = better social media 4 consumers. No unfair terms and 
conditions! No fraud and scams on social media! We need a 
#NewDealforConsumers.”95 This “New Deal” for prosumer law included:  
 
EU consumers will not be forced to waive mandatory EU 
consumer rights, such as their right to withdraw from an 
on-line purchase; they will be able to lodge their 
complaints in Europe, rather than in California; and the 
platforms will take up their fair share of responsibilities 
towards EU consumers, similarly to the off-line service 
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providers. However, the changes only partially fulfil the 
requirements under EU consumer law.96 
 
The area in which Google, Facebook, and other U.S. 
multinationals failed to take action was on ‘Notice and Action’, the 
removal of content claimed by complainants to be illegal, examined in 
greater depth by Citron, who correctly analyzes the European responses to 
platform law as “neither voluntary nor the product of meaningful public-
private partnerships. Instead, they are the result of government coercion 
occurring outside the rule of law.”97   
 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS OFFDATA, A PROSUMER LAW AGENCY 
 
History teaches us that platform regulation is not new and that 
platforms will resist effective regulation via interoperability. The 
intersection of consumer law with privacy law is driving scholars and 
policymakers towards the conclusion that prosumer law is emerging.98 
Prosumer law must do more than propose solutions to permit data deletion 
or algorithmic transparency99 because that is only an ex-post remedy that 
covers users’ tracks.100 
																																								 																				
96 European Commission Press Release IP/18/761, Social Media Companies Need to do 
More to Fully Comply with EU Consumer Rules (Feb. 15, 2018), 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-761_en.htm [https://perma.cc/KJU8-LWR6].  
97 Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship 
Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1070 (2018).  
98 Natali Helberger et al., The Perfect Match? A Closer Look at the Relationship between 
EU Consumer Law and Data Protection Law, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1427 (2017).  
99 See Lillian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to 
Explanation’ is Probably Not the Remedy You are Looking for, 16 DUKE TECH. L. REV. 
18 (2017).  
100 See Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency, 79 
MOD. L. REV. 1 (2016); Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL. L. 
REV. 513 (2015); Peter Brogden, Smart Contracts and Web 3.0: The Evolution of Law?, 
LINKEDIN (May 3, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/smart-contracts-web-30-
evolution-law-peter-brogden/ [https://perma.cc/2RKD-QJU7]; Peter Lee & Sabrina 
Richards, Res Robotica! Liability and Driverless Vehicles, SCL (Aug. 25, 2013, 10:47 
PM), https://www.scl.org/articles/3167-res-robotica-liability-and-driverless-vehicles 
[https://perma.cc/5EX4-WBCN]; Andrew Katz, Intelligent Agents and Internet 
Commerce in Ancient Rome, SCL (Oct. 15, 2008), https://www.scl.org/articles/1095-
intelligent-agents-and-internet-commerce-in-ancient-rome [https://perma.cc/NY2P-
6J6K]; Luciano Floridi, A Look into the Future Impact of ICT on Our Lives, 23 INFO. 
SOC. 59, 62 (2007); THE ONLIFE MANIFESTO - BEING HUMAN IN A HYPERCONNECTED 
ERA (Luciano Floridi ed., 2015); Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 87 (2014); Ian Kerr, Prediction, Pre-emption, Presumption: The Path of Law 
After the Computational Turn, in PRIVACY DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL 
2018 GEORGETOWN LAW TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 397 
I suggest we need an agency, whether termed OffData or the 
Federal Digital Data Regulator. This is the call for a more holistic agency 
that encompasses functions currently held by data protection regulators, 
ethics regulators, communications, consumer, and competition bodies, 
none of whom have a current expertise in algorithmic and platform 
regulation. In the UK, this would encompass functions from the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), Centre for Data Ethics and 
Innovation (Turing Institute), communications regulator (Ofcom), 
consumer and competition bodies (Competition and Markets Authority); 
all of whom are currently engaged in regulating aspects of the market. As 
the ancient Hindu proverb holds it, they are “six blind men describing an 
elephant.”101 
Prosumer law enforcement via OffData is a call to respond to 
digitial communications with a regulatory settlement that mirrors those of 
the railway age (in the United States, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission; in the United Kingdon, the Railways Board) and the analog 
communications age (Federal Radiocommunications Agency under Radio 
Act 1926 in the United States, BBC in 1925 in the UK).102 While William 
Gladstone famously regulated the electric telegraph in 1844, a mere seven 
years after its patent,103 such foresight by regulators is highly unusual, and 
academic progress can also be slow.104 
Prosumer law needs the ability for exiting prosumers to cover their 
traces, transfer their content and metadata, and permit interoperability to 
allow exit to more prosumer-friendly products than Google and Facebook, 
should prosumers wish to switch. It requires a combination of 
interconnection and interoperability, not just transparency and the 
theoretical possibility to switch.105 Only then will information platforms 
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become more competitive and prosumers have the luxury of real choice 
between very different standards offered by their hosts. 
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